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ARGUMENT 
I. HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AS 
THE PREVAILING PARTY ON THE GROBERGS' BREACH OF 
CONTRACT CLAIM BECAUSE THAT CLAIM ARISES FROM THE REPC 
The Grobergs' contention that HOI is not entitled to attorney fees for successfully 
defending against their breach of contract claim rests on the incorrect assertion that there 
were in fact two contracts that covered the house-swapping transaction between the parties: 
(1) the written REPC (which contains the attorney fee provision), and (2) a purported 
separate contract consisting of "oral representations." Thus, the Grobergs argue that the 
attorney fee provision in the REPC does not apply to the purportedly separate oral contract. 
However, this argument must fail because the trial court found that there was only one 
integrated contract covering the transaction between the parties. (See R. at 318-319.) 
When a court finds that a contract is fully integrated, this means that the writing 
contains the whole agreement between the parties and that parol evidence of conversations, 
representations or statements that vary the terms of the agreement are inadmissible. See 
State Bank of LeM v. Woolsey 565 P.2d 413 at 418 (Utah 1977). This includes evidence 
of all negotiations prior to the making of the integrated agreement that would contradict or 
add to its terms. See Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1027 
(Utah 1995); Lee v. Barnes, 911 P.2d 550, 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). However, a written 
contract may also be partially integrated. See Stanger v. Sentinel Life Insurance Company, 
669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983). In Stanger, the Court held that parol evidence may be admitted 
1 
only for the purpose of making the agreement whole, as long as such evidence is not 
inconsistent with the writing. See id at 1205 {citing30 Am. Jur. Evidence § 1043). 
In the case at bar, the trial court found that there was one partially integrated 
contract that covered the entire transaction between HOI and the Grobergs. (See R. at 318-
319.) That contract was the written REPC of July 15, 1996. 5te Appellant's Addendum at 
23-26. The REPC contains, inter alia, provisions regarding the following: the purchase 
price for the Groberg's existing house; the Grobergs' obligation to purchase Lot 13; the 
grant of easements over the Groberg property; the Grobergs' option to be restored to their 
former state of ownership and debt if not satisfied with the transaction; and the 
irrevocability of the easements. See id. at 26. 
The REPC includes both an integration clause and an attorney fee provision. At 
paragraph 14, the REPC provides that "[t]his Instrument together with its addenda, any 
attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures constitutes the entire Contract between the parties 
and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, 
understandings or contracts between the parties." See Appellant's Addendum at 24. 
Paragraph 17 provides that "[i]n any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party 
shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees." See id. 
The trial court held that the REPC was an integrated contract, except for the price of 
Lot 13. (SeeR. at 318-19.) Specifically, the trial court held that "[t]he contract is not 
integrated as to the purchase price of Lot 13 and the house on Lot 13 and parole evidence is 
admitted as to this issue only." (SeeR. at 319.) Thus, the only "oral representations" 
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admitted by the trial court were those necessary to make the REPC whole by supplying the 
purchase price of Lot 13. 
In their Amended Complaint, the Grobergs alleged a breach of a separate contract 
which could, at best, amount to a prior parol agreement that varied the final terms of the 
REPC. Under the terms of the oral contract alleged by the Grobergs, they agreed to grant 
easements to HOI across their property in exchange for either (1) a "'substantial discount'" 
on Lot 13 or (2) $10,000 for each easement plus the restoration of the landscaping. (See 
R. 48-49.) 
Even if such representations had been made by HOI, they are of no import because 
the trial court held that, except for the purchase price of Lot 13, all oral negotiations were 
superseded by the REPC. Although the Grobergs claim that, in August of 1997, HOI made 
oral representations that it would give the Grobergs an "additional discount" if they 
obtained neighbors' signatures approving HOI's plans to cover an irrigation ditch, evidence 
was introduced by HOI that by November of 1998, the parties had agreed that the Grobergs 
would pay $138,000 for the home on Lot 13. See Cross-Appellant HOI's Addendum at 19. 
Accordingly, the trial court found that the parties had either agreed to a $138,000 price, or 
in the alternative, that the Grobergs had ratified that price. (See R. at 320.) The Grobergs 
did not appeal this factual finding. 5ke Brief of Appellant (Grobergs) at 9, n3. Because this 
factual finding, along with the REPC, constitutes their final and complete agreement, the 
Grobergs cannot now argue that they had a separate contract on the easements which pre-
dates the REPC in its final, fully integrated form. 
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Because evidence of negotiations prior to the making of an integrated agreement are 
inadmissible to contradict or add to the terms of a final agreement, the Grobergs cannot 
now introduce evidence of an allegedly separate and prior oral agreement. See Hall, 890 
P.2d at 1027; Lee, 977 P.2d at 552. By operation of law, these alleged prior oral 
negotiations merged into the REPC and are therefore subject to its attorney fee provision. 
As a consequence, HOI is entitled to its attorney fees for prevailing on the Grobergs5 
breach of contract claim. 
H. HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AS 
THE PREVAILING PARTY ON THE GROBERGS5 UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT CLAIM BECAUSE THE CLAIM LEGALLY AND 
FACTUALLY OVERLAPS THE GROBERGS' MECHANIC'S LIEN CLAIM 
The Grobergs also argue that HOI cannot recover attorney fees for successfully 
defending against their unjust enrichment claim because the trial court did not specifically 
find that this claim shared facts and legal theories that overlapped their mechanic's lien 
claim. However, the overlapping legal and factual aspects of these claims are self-evident. 
With regard to fact, both claims arose out of the Grobergs5 wish to be compensated for 
labor they performed on Lot 13. With regard to law, Utah courts have held that "at the 
instance o f the owner means an express or implied contract with the owner. See Interiors 
Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982). Unjust enrichment is one 
type of "implied contract" SeeDavies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 at 269 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). Thus, mechanic's lien claims and unjust enrichment claims are of the same legal 
species. 
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m. BECAUSE THE ENTITLEMENT TO ATTORNEY FEES IS A QUESTION 
OF LAW, THIS COURT CAN DETERMINE HOPS ENTITLEMENT IN 
THE ABSENCE OF A TRIAL COURT FINDING THAT THE CASE 
INVOLVED MULTIPLE CLAIMS AND A COMMON CORE OF FACTS 
Finally, HOI has not found, and the Groberegs have failed to cite, any Utah case that 
specifically holds that a trial court must make a finding that the compensable claims (for 
purposes of attorney fees) overlap the non-compensable claims before a reviewing court 
can determine whether attorney fees should have been awarded to the prevailing party. 
Indeed, whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law, not one of fact. See 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). As argued in Point II, above, the 
overlap between the mechanic's lien claim, the contract claim, and the unjust enrichment 
claim are plainly evident from the record and from relevant case law. Therefore, assuming 
that HOI prevails on this appeal, HOI is entitled, as a matter of law, to reasonable attorney 
fees for prevailing on the Grobergs' breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in failing to award attorney fees to HOI on the breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment claims because HOI was the prevailing party at trial, and 
both the mechanic's lien statute and the REPC provide for attorney fees to the prevailing 
party. When a party is entitled to attorney fees by contract or statute, and prevails on 
multiple claims involving a common core of facts and related legal theories, he is entitled 
to all fees reasonably incurred in the litigation. See Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 
P.2d 222, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Kurth v. Wiarda, 991 P.2d 1113,1117 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1999). In the event that HOI prevails on this appeal, it requests a reversal of the trial 
court's denial of its attorney fees on the breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. 
In addition, HOI requests a remand of the case for a determination of an appropriate award 
to HOI, including the attorney fees it has incurred on appeal. 
DATED this / / day of September, 2002. 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this fUs day of September, 2002, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLANT HOUSING 
OPPORTUNITIES was served upon counsel of record by depositing the same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Bryan H. Booth 
Kirton & McConkie 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Rodney Gilmore 
P.O. Box 1971 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Ihtona d(- ((ML 
6 
